dYdX v4-client npm + PyPI compromise (wallet stealer + RAT)

What happened

On January 27, 2026, maintainer credentials for the official dYdX v4 client libraries were compromised. The attacker pushed coordinated malicious releases to both npm (@dydxprotocol/v4-client-js) and PyPI (dydx-v4-client) within a short window - the kind of cross-ecosystem timing that only works if the attacker is sitting on real publishing rights, not running a typosquat.

The npm payload is centred on a malicious createRegistry() helper that hooks the wallet flow and exfiltrates any seed phrase passed through dYdX SDK calls. The PyPI variant carries the same wallet-stealing logic plus a Python RAT triggered at import time, so simply running pip install on a dependency tree that resolves the bad version is enough.

Obfuscation density on both payloads is significantly higher than typical typosquat malware, which matches the publishing-account-takeover hypothesis. Socket linked the deobfuscated control flow back to the same operator infrastructure observed in earlier 2025 wallet-drainer campaigns.

If you maintain a downstream dYdX integration, treat any host that built against the malicious versions as compromised for crypto assets: transfer funds from a clean device first, then rotate API keys handled on that workstation.

Affected packages (2)

Impact

• Cryptocurrency wallet seed-phrase theft from any downstream dYdX integrator
• Remote command execution on Python hosts importing the package
• High-iteration obfuscation suggests publishing-infrastructure access, not typosquat

What to do

1. 1Isolate any machine that installed the malicious versions; transfer crypto from a clean device
2. 2Rotate API keys and credentials handled on the affected developer workstation
3. 3Reinstall only from versions verified against the official dYdX GitHub repository

References

• Socket: Malicious dYdX packages on npm + PyPI

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