StegaBin: 26 npm typosquats use Pastebin steganography to deliver Contagious Interview RAT
Socket disclosed 26 typosquatted npm packages tied to North Korea's Contagious Interview / FAMOUS CHOLLIMA cluster. The loader decodes steganographically-encoded Pastebin URLs to resolve C2 hosted across 31 Vercel deployments, then retrieves a 9-module infostealer and RAT toolkit.
- Threat actor
- Famous Chollima (DPRK Contagious Interview)
- Detected by
- Socket
- Also known as
- StegaBin · Contagious Interview · Famous Chollima
- Ecosystems
- npm
- Packages tracked
- 26
What happened
StegaBin is Socket's name for a 26-package npm campaign published in late February 2026 and attributed to North Korea's Contagious Interview / Famous Chollima cluster. The package names are typosquats of popular libraries - fastify-lint, expressjs-lint, loadash-lint, prism-lint, and so on - with single-character or suffix variations chosen to catch typo or autocomplete installs.
The novel piece is the resolver: the loader pulls a Pastebin page where the C2 host is encoded steganographically (zero-width whitespace and Base64-in-comments), so simple HTTP traffic analysis sees only a Pastebin fetch. Decoded, the URL points to one of 31 rotating *.vercel.app deployments that serve a 9-module infostealer and RAT toolkit.
Once running, the malware enumerates browser stores (Chrome / Edge / Brave), pulls cookies and saved credentials, harvests SSH keys and Git configs, and runs TruffleHog-style scanning across disk to find further secret material. Crypto wallet extensions are a priority target. On Windows, it stages AnyDesk for hands-on follow-up and installs a keylogger.
Socket identified C2 IP 103.106.67.63 and the Vercel deployment list. Block both at egress, hunt for AnyDesk and keylogger artefacts on Windows developer hosts, and rotate any credential reachable from a host that resolved one of the 26 packages.
Affected packages (26)
- npmargonist0.41.0
- npmbcryptance6.5.2
- npmbee-quarl2.1.2
- npmbubble-core6.26.2
- npmcorstoken2.14.7
- npmdaytonjs1.11.20
- npmether-lint5.9.4
- npmexpressjs-lint5.3.2
- npmfastify-lint5.8.0
- npmformmiderable3.5.7
- npmhapi-lint19.1.2
- npmiosysredis5.13.2
- npmjslint-config10.22.2
- npmjsnwebapptoken8.40.2
- npmkafkajs-lint2.21.3
- npmloadash-lint4.17.24
- npmmqttoken5.40.2
- npmprism-lint7.4.2
- npmpromanage6.0.21
- npmsequelization6.40.2
- npmtyporiem0.4.17
- npmundicy-lint7.23.1
- npmuuindex13.1.0
- npmvitetest-lint4.1.21
- npmwindowston3.19.2
- npmzoddle4.4.2
These are usually pulled in as transitive dependencies rather than installed directly. Check your whole tree at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.
Impact
- Browser credentials, crypto wallets, SSH and Git secrets exfiltrated
- TruffleHog-style scanning runs on victim disk to find more secrets
- Resilient C2 via rotating Vercel deployments + Pastebin dead-drops
What to do
- 1Remove any of the 26 listed packages and rotate impacted credentials
- 2Block C2 IP 103.106.67.63 and listed Vercel domains at egress
- 3Hunt for AnyDesk and keylogger artefacts on Windows dev hosts