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Criticalnpm42 affected versions

awaitly

awaitly has 42 versions on the npm registry flagged in 2 incidents we track. Other versions of this package are not implicated - only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls awaitly.

  • awaitly@1.34.0
  • awaitly@1.33.4
  • awaitly@1.33.3
  • awaitly@1.33.2
  • awaitly@1.33.1
  • awaitly@1.33.0
  • awaitly@1.32.1
  • awaitly@1.32.0
  • awaitly@1.31.1
  • awaitly@1.31.0
  • awaitly@1.30.0
  • awaitly@1.29.0
  • awaitly@1.28.0
  • awaitly@1.27.0
  • awaitly@1.26.0
  • awaitly@1.25.0
  • awaitly@1.24.0
  • awaitly@1.23.0
  • awaitly@1.22.0
  • awaitly@1.21.0
  • awaitly@1.20.0
  • awaitly@1.19.0
  • awaitly@1.18.0
  • awaitly@1.17.0
  • awaitly@1.16.0
  • awaitly@1.15.0
  • awaitly@1.14.0
  • awaitly@1.13.0
  • awaitly@1.12.0
  • awaitly@1.11.0
  • awaitly@1.10.0
  • awaitly@1.9.0
  • awaitly@1.8.0
  • awaitly@1.7.0
  • awaitly@1.6.0
  • awaitly@1.5.1
  • awaitly@1.5.0
  • awaitly@1.4.0
  • awaitly@1.3.0
  • awaitly@1.2.0
  • awaitly@1.1.0
  • awaitly@1.0.0

The 2 incidents that flagged it

High

GHSA-flagged malware brands - 16 autotel-*, 4 awaitly-*, and `ai-sdk-ollama` packages (Nov 2025–Jun 2026) marked embedded-malicious-code on 2026-06-29/30

GitHub's Advisory Database dropped CWE-506 (Embedded Malicious Code) records on 2026-06-29 and 2026-06-30 against 21 npm "brand" packages built up over months: the entire autotel-* observability family (16 packages, 400+ versions), the awaitly promise-utility family (4 packages, ~180 versions), and the ai-sdk-ollama Vercel AI-SDK typosquat (55 versions). Every published version of every listed package is now classified as malware.

Versions named here: 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.2.0, 1.3.0, 1.4.0, 1.5.0, 1.5.1, 1.6.0, 1.7.0, 1.8.0, 1.9.0, 1.10.0, 1.11.0, 1.12.0, 1.13.0, 1.14.0, 1.15.0, 1.16.0, 1.17.0, 1.18.0, 1.19.0, 1.20.0, 1.21.0, 1.22.0, 1.23.0, 1.24.0, 1.25.0, 1.26.0, 1.27.0, 1.28.0, 1.29.0, 1.30.0, 1.31.0, 1.31.1, 1.32.0, 1.32.1, 1.33.0, 1.33.1, 1.33.2, 1.33.3, 1.33.4, 1.34.0

Critical

Phantom Gyp Miasma worm hits @vapi-ai/server-sdk and the jagreehal portfolio via binding.gyp

Between 23:30 UTC on 2026-06-03 and ~01:30 UTC on 2026-06-04 the Miasma worm published a malicious 157-byte binding.gyp payload through 57 npm packages and 286+ versions, starting at @vapi-ai/server-sdk (~408k weekly downloads) and cascading across the jagreehal maintainer's autotel-*, awaitly-*, ai-sdk-*, executable-stories-*, node-env-resolver-*, and wrangler-deploy portfolio. GitHub Advisories backfilled the full affected-version set across the autotel-* family and the wider awaitly-* portfolio on 2026-06-29 / 2026-06-30 (16 new autotel-* GHSAs plus expanded awaitly / awaitly-mongo / awaitly-libsql / awaitly-analyze ranges).

Versions named here: 1.33.3

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. 1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
  2. 2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. 3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. 4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

awaitly is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Check my package-lock.json All flagged npm packages

Other packages in the same incident

If awaitly is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.