chai-as-assured has 2 versions on the npm registry flagged in 2 incidents we track. Other versions of this package are not implicated - only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.
Affected versions
Check what you actually have installed with npm ls chai-as-assured.
On 2026-06-30 GitHub's Advisory Database dropped a coordinated batch of ~25 CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code advisories against unrelated npm packages published between 2026-05-27 and 2026-06-30. The batch mixes at least four distinct sub-clusters: chai-as-persisted / chai-as-assured (Chai typosquats), brock-loader / brock-react-alerts (with a 9999.0.0 dep-confusion tag), the rebrandly-domains-* pair (both 9999.0.0), and a wider fan-out of standalone malicious names.
On 2026-06-26 → 2026-06-28 the same DPRK-linked operator behind the March jsonspack npm campaign restarted with chai-as-persisted and chai-as-assured - typosquats of chai-as-promised that ship install-time RCE droppers. Four versions across the two packages were published with the same hello@jsonspack.com author bug URL, fetching attacker JavaScript from ipregionchecker.org via new Function.constructor on every npm install.
Versions named here: 7.1.2, 6.0.4
What to do if you installed one of these
Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.
1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.
Check your whole project
chai-as-assured is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.
Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.
