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Criticalnpm18 affected versions

defi-threat-scanner

defi-threat-scanner has 18 versions on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Other versions of this package are not implicated - only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls defi-threat-scanner.

  • defi-threat-scanner@4.0.0
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.8
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.7
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.6
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.5
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.4
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.3
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.2
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.1
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.2.0
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.1.3
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.1.2
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.1.1
  • defi-threat-scanner@3.1.0
  • defi-threat-scanner@2.1.3
  • defi-threat-scanner@2.1.2
  • defi-threat-scanner@2.1.1
  • defi-threat-scanner@2.1.0

The incident that flagged it

Critical

TrapDoor / AuditorTrap crypto-stealer campaign across npm, PyPI and crates.io

Starting 2026-05-22 the TrapDoor / AuditorTrap campaign pushed 34+ malicious packages (384+ versions) across npm, PyPI and crates.io posing as crypto/DeFi/AI dev tools and fake "security guild" branding. Payloads steal SSH keys, cloud credentials and Solana/Sui/Aptos wallets, and hide zero-width-Unicode prompt injection in CLAUDE.md/.cursorrules to trick Claude Code and Cursor into running the stealer.

Versions named here: 2.1.0, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 3.1.0, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.2.0, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.2.7, 3.2.8, 4.0.0

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. 1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
  2. 2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. 3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. 4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

defi-threat-scanner is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Check my package-lock.json All flagged npm packages

Other packages in the same incident

If defi-threat-scanner is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.