Criticalnpm3 affected versions

rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect

rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect has 3 versions on the npm registry flagged in 2 incidents we track. Other versions of this package are not implicated - only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect.

  • rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect@1.0.3
  • rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect@1.0.2
  • rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect@1.0.1

The 2 incidents that flagged it

Critical

JFrog: Lazarus / OtterCookie `rollup-*-polyfill-core` npm campaign - 6 packages steal AI-coder credentials, browser data and crypto wallets

JFrog Security Research disclosed a 6-package DPRK / Contagious Interview npm campaign that mimics the legitimate rollup-plugin-polyfill-node project down to its metadata. First-stage packages carry a base64-encoded npm install that fetches an SVG-utility-shaped second stage; the second stage evaluates a payload pulled from JSONKeeper and steals credentials for AWS, Azure, Google Gemini, Anthropic Claude, Windsurf, Cursor, VS Code, SSH and Zsh, plus browser data and crypto wallets. Two of the first-stage packages are STILL live on npm as of 2026-07-04.

Versions named here: 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3

High

npm typosquat sweep - `pump-stream-logger`, `pump-laserstream-parser`, `pino-zod`, `rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect` yanked

On 2026-06-26 npm yanked four malicious typosquat packages within hours of each other - pump-stream-logger, pump-laserstream-parser, and pino-zod were taken down within a 10-second window at 05:10 UTC, and rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect followed at 12:16 UTC. All four are GHSA-classified as CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code; the package names target the Helius Solana streaming SDK, the Pino logger family, the Zod validation library, and the rollup-plugin-polyfill-node Rollup plugin.

Versions named here: 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

  1. 1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
  2. 2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
  3. 3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
  4. 4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Other packages in the same incident

If rollup-plugin-polyfill-connect is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.