Highnpm2 affected versions

supersignaturenature

supersignaturenature has 2 versions on the npm registry flagged in 1 incident we track. Other versions of this package are not implicated - only the exact versions listed below were named by the source advisories.

Affected versions

Check what you actually have installed with npm ls supersignaturenature.

supersignaturenature@1.0.6
supersignaturenature@1.0.5

The incident that flagged it

High29 Aug 2026

GitHub Advisory malware sweep - 2026-08-29 batch (npm `access-token-delta` vercel.app remote-eval cluster (3, `eth-pino` + `js-array-tokens` + `js-tokens-array`) + npm `limbomail.com` Discord-MFA Windows dropper pair (`mfacord` + `mfakit`) + npm `secretkey2fa` Minecraft/Microsoft-account stealer + npm `supersignaturenature` RSA/DES chain via `manager-thedate` + npm `techportal` HTTP+DNS beacon to `oob.asm5.net` + npm `vs-modules` Windows .bat dropper + npm `vitest-chalk-pro` jsonbin.io detached-child C2 + npm `repo.securityctrl.com` mass dependency-confusion probe (18+ enterprise namespaces: Intuit, Atlassian, Firebase, Postman, Oracle, Amplitude, Ring, Alimama, Nx, Libra…) + npm `grafeno-` preinstall + cron persistence cluster (9 packages, 216.126.236.46/x.sh) + PyPI `calcboxlite` + `pygame-renderkit` misc + massive scripted CWE-506 bursts (`3layerdipstack` ~100+, `classlink-*` ~100+))

Large 24h window ending 2026-08-29: the standout is a compromise of @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen by the "Trinitite" Mini Shai-Hulud continuation (tracked separately). Around it: three coordinated operator clusters with full IOCs (npm vercel.app remote-eval typosquats, npm limbomail.com Discord-MFA droppers, npm repo.securityctrl.com mass enterprise-namespace dependency-confusion probe), a grafeno-* cron-persistence cluster, and hundreds of scripted CWE-506 boilerplate burst-publishes (3layerdipstack*, classlink-*).

Versions named here: 1.0.5, 1.0.6

What to do if you installed one of these

Treat the machine as compromised rather than simply upgrading. Packages in these incidents typically execute at install time, so the payload has already run with whatever credentials were in the environment.

1.Rotate every credential that machine or CI job could reach - registry tokens, cloud keys, SSH keys, CI secrets - from a different machine.
2.Pin to a version not listed above, then reinstall from a clean lockfile.
3.Clear caches and private mirrors. Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, and devpi routinely keep serving a tarball after the public registry has pulled it.
4.Read the incident write-up above - recommended actions differ per incident, and some have specific indicators of compromise worth grepping your logs for.

Check your whole project

supersignaturenature is one of many packages in these incidents, and it is usually pulled in as a transitive dependency rather than one you installed directly. Paste your package-lock.json to check every dependency at once - it runs in your browser and nothing is uploaded.

Check my package-lock.json All flagged npm packages

Other packages in the same incident

If supersignaturenature is in your tree, these are worth checking too - they were published by the same campaign.

See the full incident

Version data comes from the public advisories cited on each incident page. We list only versions those advisories name - we don't infer additional ones. Think this is wrong or incomplete? Tell us.